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ABSTRACT 
SCOTT C. O’BRIEN: Who’s Driving? Uncovering the Source of Opinion Change in 
American Politics 
(Under the direction of James A. Stimson) 
 
    This paper attempts to determine whether citizens that “drive” changes in public opinion 
share certain demographic characteristics. Extant theory informs us that these citizens should 
be attentive to media signals (sophisticated) and unattached to either side of the ideological 
spectrum (moderate). Conversely, unsophisticated ideologues should be unresponsive 
because they do not pay attention to media signals and are attached to an ideology that 
mitigates their response.  
    I analyze three time series from the General Social Survey. In each, I find parallel opinion 
movement from sophisticated moderates and unsophisticated ideologues. Using regression 
analysis, I find that sophisticated moderates contribute significantly more to changes in 
executive confidence, unsophisticated ideologues contribute significantly more to changes in 
welfare spending preferences, and both strata contribute equally to changes in defense 
spending preferences. I conclude that the extant theory is not supported empirically; there is 
no evidence that sophisticated moderates consistently “drive” changes in public opinion.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
    Publicly, presidents often shrug off presidential approval numbers as inconsequential. 
They like to be perceived as acting on their own agenda that does not respond to the fickle 
nature of public opinion. However, macro-political research demonstrates that government is 
indeed responsive to the preferences of the public (Page and Shapiro 1983, Erikson, 
MacKuen, Stimson 2002). The question then arises: Who drives changes in these 
preferences? The answer to this question has major implications for representation in 
America; since government responds to opinion, we need to know to whom it responds. Is it 
everyone? Only those who follow politics? Those with strong ideological attachments? In 
this paper, I attempt to uncover the answer. 
    The paper is structured as follows: First, I review the existing literature on aggregate 
opinion change. Next, I formulate a theoretical expectation and derive a testable hypothesis 
from this expectation. Then I assess this hypothesis graphically and statistically using data 
from the cumulative General Social Survey (GSS). Finally, I discuss the results and their 
implications for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
WHAT WE KNOW 
 
    Somehow, an uninformed and inattentive individual-level public (Converse 1964) appears 
sophisticated, responsive, and forward-looking when making aggregate decisions (Erikson, 
Stimson, MacKuen 2002). Ostensibly, when aggregated, individual-level randomness and 
consistency (i.e., “noise”) cancel out. The “signal” (i.e., opinion movement) is generated by 
citizens who are responsive to politics and unbiased in their response. For example, 
partisanship is a strong determinant of individual-level presidential approval, but when we 
compile all individual responses to approval, the partisan responses either remain constant 
over time or fluctuate randomly. What is left behind is a clean, clear, and remarkably well-
behaved signal that responds to changes in the political landscape, much to the chagrin of the 
Conversian school of political science.  
    But who drives the changes in public opinion? The issue enjoys plenty of theoretical play 
but little empirical work. The Macro Polity argues that “when Presidential Approval 
changes, it is the people who are aware of the president’s activity who move.” These citizens 
“pay attention and respond in meaningful ways to political cues” (Erikson, MacKuen, 
Stimson 6-7). The micro-level literature supports this hypothesis because low-sophisticates 
do not pay attention to politics and therefore should not be responsive to political information 
(Converse 1964). However, high-sophisticates also tend to be strong partisans and 
ideologues, meaning their perceptions should be constant over time. What to do?   
    There are three theoretically feasible ways to explain aggregate opinion change on the sub-
aggregate level. The messiest of these is what Erikson, et al. refer to as the “baseline model”: 
the signal comes from a randomly distributed group of people who have nothing more in 
 3 
common than their proclivity to react (Erikson et.al. 214). For example, if economic forecasts 
are bad, it may be the case that some Republicans penalize President Bush and that some 
low-sophisticates receive enough economic forecast information to adjust their approval 
accordingly. If this scenario were true, we would observe similar opinion change across all 
strata of sophistication.   
    A second possibility is the “opinion elite” model, which states that opinion movement 
results from a segment of the electorate that pays an inordinate amount of attention to 
politics. Everyone else generates noise that cancels when aggregated, leaving the elite signal 
as the dynamic element (214). This explanation is consistent with the Macro Polity story: 
those who pay attention drive the signal. If this scenario were true, when examining time 
disaggregated time series data visually, we would expect to see nearly flat lines from all but 
the most highly sophisticated stratum.   
    The third potential explanation is the “peripheral voter” model, which is the inverse of the 
opinion elite model: Since highly sophisticated elites tend to be attached to a party or 
ideology, we should not expect their opinions to change over time. On the other hand, low-
sophisticates lack these attachments and therefore respond dynamically to whatever political 
information they receive, even if it is rhetorical spin from cable news shows (214). 
    I do not expect reality to be nearly as organized as these theories would suggest. But they 
represent useful ways to conceptualize expectations. Using General Social Survey (GSS) 
data, Erikson, et al. test the three theories using the policy mood time series disaggregated by 
education level. They find no support for the peripheral voter model; the lesser educated 
move less than all of the other groups. But, contrary to expectations, Erikson, et al. find no 
support for the opinion elite model either. While opinion change for the highly educated 
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groups is sharper and larger, the other education levels move far too much to be consistent 
with the opinion elite model, which would predict nearly flat lines for the lesser educated. 
Erikson and his colleagues conclude that the baseline model is the best representation of 
reality; when it comes to policy mood, “the better educated move more than do others, but 
movement seems to come from all strata of American society” (219). 
    We have seen the baseline model before: Page and Shapiro (1992) coined the term 
“parallel publics” to describe the observation that all strata of Americans tend to “change 
their policy preferences in the same direction and to about the same extent” (294). Regarding 
education (the closest measure to sophistication available in time series form), Page and 
Shapiro found substantial differences in trends in fewer than five percent of their 
comparisons across education levels (315). When they do note differences, their findings are 
consistent with Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson. Page and Shapiro note that those with “the 
most education...change opinion by the greatest amount,” and do so more quickly than the 
less educated (316, 317).  They attribute these differences to educated citizens’ greater 
information exposure and superior information processing speed – but they caution that 
educated citizens’ information capacity often leads to stable opinions and hence smaller than 
expected opinion change (316, see also MacKuen 1984 and Rahn et. al. 1994). Further, Page 
and Shapiro warn against taking the idea that the highly educated lead the less educated 
beyond conjecture.1      
    Other research suggests that sophisticates are the most responsive to the media (Miller and 
Krosnick 2000). Additionally, Krosnick and Brannon (1993) find that presidential approval 
moves more dramatically among the most educated. Building on The Macro Polity and The 
                                                 
1 Page and Shapiro find evidence that in several cases, the least educated appear to influence the most educated. 
A Granger causality test might help establish the validity of the conclusion that one stratum influences another. 
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Rational Public and using GSS data on policy mood, Peter Enns and Paul Kellstedt find 
empirical support for “parallelism” -- responsiveness across all strata of education, including 
the least educated (Enns et. al. 2006).2 However, consistent with the predictions of Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson (2002), the highly educated show more pronounced movements over 
time than the less educated, who also tend to lag behind in their response.  
    A few studies have refuted parallelism. Most notably, Krosnick and Kinder (1990) find 
support for the peripheral voter model: the least educated change presidential approval more 
than any other strata. Zaller (1991) disaggregates party identification and finds non-parallel 
opinion change on social welfare and defense spending. Similarly, Zaller (1992) finds that 
support for the Vietnam War in 1970 plummeted among the most politically aware while the 
least aware first increased then only marginally decreased support (202). He argues that we 
should see a greater response from the highly aware when the media present competing 
information flows (which happened in 1970). Finally, Bartels (1994) finds “almost no trace 
of parallel changes in the structure of defense spending preferences” after the end of the Cold 
War; the most highly informed preferred significantly lower spending levels, whereas “the 60 
percent of the public that is less informed about politics” preferred only marginally lower 
spending. In all of the above studies, the longevity of the opinion change differences is 
uncertain because the research does not analyze long time series of data. It is possible that the 
time series return to parallelism after a short time, in which case the above evidence may be 
too narrowly focused or even indicate opinion leadership from the highly educated stratum 
instead of non-parallelism.  
 
 
                                                 
2 However, this research does not address the size of the strata responses in relation to the aggregate response. 
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THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS 
 
    After considering the existing literature, the question of exactly who drives opinion change 
remains a mystery. The theoretical basis of The Macro Polity and evidence that non-parallel 
opinion structures exist with regard to partisanship tell us that sophistication levels are only 
part of the story. What other characteristics should these “responders” possess?   
    The speculative but logically sound theoretical argument James Stimson makes in his book 
Tides of Consent (2005) is particularly useful here. It is that responsiveness comes from a 
relatively small number of people (“scorekeepers”) who are “informed yet dispassionate” 
about politics (Stimson 163, emphasis added). Stimson does not attempt to ascertain the 
group’s size (though he implies it is extremely small), but states that its members should have 
no underlying attachment to either political party and pragmatically evaluate presidential 
management.  
    The Macro Polity proposes and empirically supports the hypothesis that the media transmit 
political information to the electorate. Those who are politically attentive effectively receive 
updated political information and respond to it by adjusting their opinion in a way that 
accurately reflects the information signal. For example, if a citizen reads a newspaper story 
about declining unemployment, she adjusts her approval of the president in a way that 
proportionately reflects this change. Those who have partisan or ideological affiliations will 
filter the media signal through their biases and their response to the signal is either attenuated 
or disproportionately large depending on whether the information is favorable or unfavorable 
to their party or ideology. These adjustments, when aggregated, cancel one another. Those 
who are not politically attentive will not see the signal in the first place. The result: no 
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response. Therefore, those who move opinion should be attentive to political information, 
non-ideological, and non-partisan.  
    Our theory thus tells us that we should expect the scorekeepers to have more in common 
than high political awareness. They should also be ideologically moderate. It is easy to 
conclude that since the results of analyses using sophistication alone indicate parallel publics, 
we should dismiss the idea that there is a group of citizens we can isolate that drives opinion. 
I disagree. Just like we do in micro-analysis, we should control variables that might be 
obfuscating our results. So, I intend to do that here by controlling for citizen ideology in 
addition to sophistication.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
    I analyze time series data from the cumulative General Social Survey (GSS). I model the 
impact of relevant sophistication/ideological strata on the overall change in three variables 
from 1974 to 2004: (1) confidence in the executive branch of the government (EC); (2) 
defense spending preferences (DSP), and (3) welfare spending preferences (WSP). I am not 
interested in predicting changes in these variables. Instead, I am interested in understanding 
who is responsible for the changes. For simplicity’s sake, I analyze a single, arbitrarily 
selected response category for each variable. I disaggregate each dependent variable time 
series by sophistication and ideology. First, I analyze the series visually to assess whether 
parallelism exists. Next, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to perform a regression of the 
change in each variable between time points on the change for each disaggregated group of 
interest. This allows me to assess the contribution of each group to the overall change. My 
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theory specifies that sophisticated moderates should influence the overall change most and 
this group should contrast most sharply with unsophisticated ideologues, who should be both 
biased and inattentive to political information.3 Therefore, due to sample size considerations 
and to avoid cluttered charts and tables, I only analyze these two groups of respondents.4 The 
models are specified as follows:5 
 
∆Executive Confidence (A Great Deal)t-(t-1) = β0 + ∆EC for Highly Educated Moderatest-(t-1) + 
∆EC for Least Educated Ideologuest-(t-1) + εt-(t-1) 
 
∆Defense Spending Preferences (Spending Too Little)t-(t-1) = β0 + ∆DSP for Highly Educated 
Moderatest-(t-1) + ∆DSP for Least Educated Ideologuest-(t-1) + εt-(t-1) 
 
∆Welfare Spending Preferences (Spending Too Much)t-(t-1) = β0 + ∆WSP for Highly 
Educated Moderatest-(t-1) + ∆WSP for Least Educated Ideologuest-(t-1) + εt-(t-1) 
 
    I use education level, measured by highest grade completed, as a surrogate for political 
sophistication because no sophistication measure exists in time series datasets. Further, past 
research has demonstrated education is a robust substitute (Althaus 2003).6 To measure 
ideology, the GSS uses a seven-point scale with “moderate” as the middle response and 
                                                 
3 We would expect ideological non-sophisticates to be both biased in their response to information and less 
likely to receive information to begin with – the complete opposite of moderate sophisticates.  
4 Yearly sample sizes for each stratum range from approximately 50 to 300 respondents. 
 
5 The symbol  “∆” stands for “change in” throughout this paper.  
 
6 Luskin (1990), among others, has quarreled with the use of education as a substitute for sophistication. 
However, analyses consistently demonstrate high correlations between education and sophistication measures 
(see Enns 2006a). 
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“extremely liberal” and “extremely conservative” at the extremes. I define “Highly Educated 
Moderates” (HEMs) as respondents that have completed at least two years of college and 
consider themselves to be ideological moderates. I define “Least Educated Ideologues” 
(LEIs) as respondents that have not completed high school and possess some type of 
ideological attachment.  
    The Executive Confidence variable measures the percentage of respondents that has “a 
great deal of confidence in the people running the executive branch of the federal 
government.” The Defense Spending Preferences variable measures the percentage of 
respondents that think the United States spends “too little” on “the military, armaments, and 
defense.” The Welfare Spending Preferences variable measures the percentage of 
respondents that think the United States spends “too much” on welfare. 
 
Hypothesis 
    It is foolish to expect reality to conform perfectly to a stylized ideal such as the opinion-
elite model. Therefore, I avoid the expectation of a massive response from highly educated 
moderates and flat lines from everyone else. Instead, my hypothesis is based on a weaker 
version of the opinion elite model: 
 
Hypothesis: Highly educated moderates will contribute significantly more to changes in 
aggregate opinion than the least educated ideologues.  
 
Surely there are some responsive citizens with low education levels that drive the movement 
within their stratum. But they should not be driving the movement of the entire series 
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because their response should be small compared to the response of highly educated 
moderates. I expect to see highly educated moderates driving the signal with a significantly 
less dramatic (and perhaps lagged) response from the least educated ideologues. For reasons 
described above, comparing these two strata gives the weak opinion elite model the best 
chance of success. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
    First, I analyze each time series disaggregated by education level and ideology. Figure 1, 
below, shows the Executive Confidence series.7 The dynamics of this series should be similar 
to a presidential approval series since approval is largely based on confidence.8 This series 
shows compelling evidence of parallelism. In particular, the spikes in confidence in 1977 and 
after 9/11 (2002) are almost identical in magnitude across the strata. Highly educated 
moderates track almost perfectly with the overall series, though this group appears to have 
responded earlier and more favorably than the LEIs to the moderate George H. W. Bush 
Administration (prior to the Gulf War in 1991). The LEIs exhibit higher baseline confidence 
in the Bill Clinton Administration that appears to survive the transition to President George 
W. Bush. Further, the LEIs series exhibits quite a bit of fluctuation that may be attributable to 
higher sampling error among the least educated. 
                                                 
7 All data smoothed using Microsoft Excel’s smoothing algorithm. 
 
8 See Erikson et al. (2002), p. 31 for a concise summary of the presidential approval literature. 
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Figure 1. Confidence in People Running the Executive Branch: A Great Deal, 
1974-2004
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Figure 2. Defense: Spending Too Little, 
1974-2004
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    Figure 2, above, displays the percentage of respondents each year who said the United 
States was “spending too little” on “the military, armaments, and defense.” The baseline for 
the LEIs is higher, perhaps because this stratum is more likely to be employed or have family 
members who are employed by the military. Again we see clear evidence of parallelism, 
most notably in 1980 when the preceding presidential campaign made national defense a 
salient issue and generated a perception that defense spending was inadequate. The series 
make clear that this signal reached all strata of the American public; all three series spike to 
around 60 percent. Interestingly, we see a non-parallel response when HEMs dip 
considerably low in the mid-1980s while the LEIs remain stable around 20 percent. Perhaps 
HEMs were responding to the increasing national debt or reacting directly to President 
Ronald Reagan’s aggressive second-term increases in defense spending. In any event, HEMs 
responded systematically to a signal that the LEIs either did not respond to or did not see. 
While a speculative inference to draw, the data leave open the possibility that, at times, 
HEMs may respond differently than other strata. However, it is clear from the series that 
HEMs were not driving the overall change. Finally, it is interesting to note a general upward 
trend for all strata beginning in 1993 and continuing through 9/11 – a period of relative peace 
but substantial cuts in defense spending under President Clinton. Thus, it appears the public 
as a whole responds to changes in defense spending by adjusting their perceptions 
accordingly. 
    The final series I analyze is the percentage of respondents who believe the United States is 
spending too much on welfare. Figure 3 (below) displays the series. Again we see parallel 
strata. The baseline for the LEIs tends to be lower than the overall series since the least 
educated tend to also earn the lowest incomes and hence benefit most from welfare spending. 
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Therefore, they would be least likely to say the government was spending too much on 
welfare. Likewise, the baseline for HEMs is higher than the overall series until the mid-
1980s, though the reason the series loses this baseline is unclear.9 Also notable are the 
somewhat divergent reactions of HEMs and LEIs to the 1996 welfare reform. Highly 
educated moderates at first decided that Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) resulted 
in too much welfare spending but then adjusted this perception downward in 2000. At the  
Figure 3. Welfare: Spending Too Much, 
1974-2004
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same time, a decline in the percentage of LEIs that felt there was too much welfare spending 
began before TANF was signed into law and steadily declined until 2000, indicating sharp 
responsiveness to (and perhaps anticipation of) the spending cuts and eligibility limitations 
TANF imposed. 
                                                 
9 Perhaps as a response to perceptions of growing income inequality between lower and upper class citizens. 
 14 
    In sum, with minor exceptions, all three series display parallel opinion change across both 
strata. The Executive Confidence measure offers limited evidence that HEMs drive the 
overall series since the two series track almost perfectly while the LEIs series wanders a bit. 
However, one could infer the inverse scenario with regard to welfare spending preferences; 
LEIs appear to track more neatly with the overall series. The defense series is too hard to 
call. It is important to keep in mind that these are weak inferences drawn form visual 
inspection of data; the parallelism is too strong across the strata to conclude that either one 
meaningfully drives the overall change in the series. However, statistical analysis can tell us 
which stratum is contributing more to the overall movement of each series. If HEMs 
contribute significantly more to the change in each series, I can salvage my hypothesis. 
    Next, I assess the effect of each stratum on overall opinion change.10 For each of the three 
series (executive confidence, defense spending preferences, welfare spending preferences), I 
regress the changes in percentage between time points for the fully aggregated series on the 
changes in percentage between time points for highly educated moderates and the least 
educated ideologues. I run three models for each series: one for each stratum separately and a 
full model.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 I use regression instead of correlations. Correlation coefficients overstate relationships because they capture 
bidirectional similarities in variable changes. For example, two variables are correlated if they move together 
similarly but in opposite directions. 
 
11 This is not a typical time series analysis because the differencing largely cleans out error. There is no need for 
a lagged dependent variable (LDV) because I have no reason to expect past changes to influence future changes. 
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Table 1. Effect of Strata Change on Overall Change in Executive Confidence: 
1974-2004 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Changes in Highly 
Educated Moderates  
.804* 
(.066) 
 .590* 
(.106) 
Changes in Least Educated 
Ideologues  
 .794* 
(.101) 
.275* 
(.112) 
Constant .003 
(.006) 
.003 
(.008) 
.003 
(.005) 
R2 .89 .76 .91 
               Table entries are OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed test. *p<.05. N=21.   
               Correlation between ∆Highly Educated Moderates and ∆Least Educated Ideologues is 0.83. 
               Average yearly sample size for HEMs = 134.9, LEIs = 209.4. 
 
    Table 1 (above) displays the Executive Confidence series results. The coefficients for the 
full model indicate that changes in the HEMs series contribute substantially more to the 
changes in the overall series than the changes in the LEIs series do. The Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) for both strata is 3.19, which indicates that colinearity is not significantly 
distorting the Model 3 estimates.12 Further, in the individual model runs, the change in the 
HEMs series explains more variance (.89) in the overall series than the LEIs series does 
(.76). The average yearly sample size for HEMs is significantly smaller (134.9) than that of 
the LEIs (209.4). These results lend support to my hypothesis and a weak version of the 
opinion-elite model. 
    Table 2 (below) displays the results for the second series. The coefficient for HEMs is 
higher than the coefficient for the LEIs but this time only marginally. In the individual 
models, the LEIs coefficient is greater than the HEMs coefficient. Again, the VIF (2.83) tells 
us that colinearity of the strata is not an issue. The R-squared values are similar.13 Again, the   
                                                 
12 A VIF greater than 10 is generally considered problematic. 
 
13 Running this model using a lower grade level criterion for “Least Educated Ideologues” (fewer than 10 years 
of education instead of fewer than 12) yields a much larger coefficient for HEMs.  
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Table 2. Effect of Strata Change on Overall Change in Defense Spending Preferences: 
1974-2004 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Change in Highly Educated 
Moderates 
.790* 
(.063) 
 .498* 
(.070) 
Change in Least Educated 
Ideologues 
 .928* 
(.094) 
.442* 
(.085) 
Constant .001 
(.008) 
.002 
(.010) 
.001 
(.005) 
R2 .89 .83 .95 
               Table entries are OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed test. *p<.05.  N=22. 
               Correlation between ∆Highly Educated Moderates and ∆Least Educated Ideologues is 0.80. 
               Average yearly sample size for HEMs = 100.6, LEIs = 174.9. 
 
average yearly sample size for HEMs (100.6) is smaller than that of the LEIs (174.9), which 
indicates that the HEMs coefficient may be attenuated.  However, this series does not provide 
evidence that HEMs contribute significantly more than the LEIs to the aggregate signal. 
Instead, it supports the baseline model. Perhaps the public uniformly receives and responds 
to spending signals, but executive confidence, a more abstract concept, is subject to more 
randomness from LEIs. Additionally, it is possible that the LEIs are particularly attentive to 
defense spending because, as stated above, the LEIs are more likely than other strata to have 
military affiliations.  
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Table 3. Effect of Strata Change on Overall Change in Welfare Spending Preferences: 
1974-2004 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Change in Highly Educated 
Moderates 
.538* 
(.104) 
 .212* 
(.079) 
Change in Least Educated 
Ideologues 
 .761* 
(.082) 
.599* 
(.093) 
Constant -.001 
(.011) 
.000 
(.007) 
.000 
(.006) 
R2 .57 .81 .86 
               Table entries are OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed test. *p<.05. N=22. 
               Correlation between ∆Highly Educated Moderates and ∆Least Educated Ideologues is 0.65.  
               Average yearly sample size for HEMs = 100.3, LEIs = 187.7. 
 
    Finally, Table 3 (above) shows the models for the welfare spending preferences series. For 
this series, the scenario is the opposite of the Executive Confidence series: we see a much 
larger coefficient for the LEIs stratum. Therefore, the LEIs series has a far greater influence 
on the overall series than the HEMs series does. Colinearity is not a problem (VIF=1.72). 
The explained variance is also much higher for the LEIs individual model (.81) compared to 
the HEMs individual model (.57). The average yearly sample size again favors the LEIs 
(183.7 to 100.3), which indicates that the LEIs coefficient may be overstated. Despite this 
caveat, these findings support a weak version of the peripheral voter model: on welfare 
spending preferences, the least educated ideologues contribute significantly more to changes 
in the overall series than highly educated moderates – a finding consistent with Zaller’s 
(1991) work. The reasons we might expect this are straightforward: The least educated tend 
to have low incomes, which makes them potential beneficiaries of welfare programs. 
Therefore, it is in the interest of LEIs to pay attention to welfare spending levels. Highly 
educated moderates, who tend to have middle class or better incomes, may produce noisier 
welfare spending preferences because they have little incentive to pay attention to welfare 
spending per se. 
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    Before concluding the analysis, it would be useful to determine whether the coefficient 
differences between strata are statistically significant. It is easy to observe two coefficients 
and conclude that the theory is correct (or incorrect) because the coefficients differ in size. 
But we must also show that they are significantly different – that there is little chance the 
effects are actually the same in the population. Table 4 (below) reports the results of 
significance tests for each series of Model 3 coefficient differences between HEMs and the 
LEIs. There are no surprises here.  
 
Table 4. Assessing Whether Differences in Strata Effects are Statistically Significant 
 Model 3 Coefficient Difference 
(∆Highly Educated Moderates - 
∆Least Educated Ideologues) 
Executive Confidence 
(N=21) 
.315* 
(.109) 
Defense Spending 
(N=22) 
.056 
(.077) 
Welfare Spending 
(N=22) 
-.387* 
(.086) 
                          Table Entries are OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis and computed using the     
                          following formula: √(SE∆HEMs*SE∆LEIs) where SE is standard error. One-tailed test.*p<.05. 
   
The coefficient differences for Executive Confidence and Welfare Spending preferences are 
significant but the coefficient difference for Defense Spending is not. Therefore, my earlier 
analysis remains robust: Highly educated moderates contributed significantly more than the 
least educated ideologues to overall changes in Executive Confidence and the least educated 
ideologues contributed significantly more to changes in Welfare Spending preferences than 
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highly educated moderates. Contrary to Zaller’s findings on defense spending, both groups 
contribute about equally to the movement of the overall series.14 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
   The visual evidence makes it clear that neither stratum “drives” opinion change in the way 
the opinion elite or peripheral voter models imply it should (i.e. dramatic change from one 
stratum and nearly flat lines from the other). Instead, one stratum may contribute 
significantly more to the overall change of a series than another while the strata on the series 
graph still appear parallel. The reason we see parallelism is because only a relatively small 
number of respondents need to change their opinion to make the stratum move with the 
overall series. 
    Statistically speaking, there is no cut-and-dry answer to “Who’s driving?” either. My 
hypothesis is not supported by the data and thus neither is the theoretical supposition that 
highly sophisticated and politically dispassionate citizens are solely responsible for moving 
opinion. However, the baseline model may be too extreme. My analysis shows that some 
people move systematically more than others; it is not a random distribution of reactions. 
Similarly, the two remaining models (opinion elite model and peripheral voter model) are 
overstated and inaccurate. Neither consistently describes reality though each may do so for 
particular macrovariables.  
                                                 
14 I also tested for causality between strata; I conducted Granger causality tests for both strata in all three series 
and found no significant causation at all relevant lags and in both directions. Therefore, I conclude that there is 
no evidence that the strata influence one another. 
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       We have three different series that each suggests a different conclusion about who drives 
opinion change. Perhaps the only reasonable interpretation of these results is that the “driver” 
may vary across issues. In other words, highly educated moderates may drive opinion on 
some issues, the least educated ideologues may drive opinion on others, and other strata not 
specified in this paper may drive change on the rest. The stratum that drives opinion change 
may be the one that has the greatest incentive to care about the issue (e.g. low income 
citizens on welfare).15 Such a group would not be constant across issues, nor would it 
necessarily share demographic characteristics within issues, making future research on this 
topic a difficult endeavor.16 However, the driving force behind so-called “Macro Polity” 
variables (e.g. policy mood, macropartisanship, and presidential approval) should be the 
politically aware because these citizens ostensibly care most about politics.17 
    What theoretical revisions make sense given my empirical findings? A key observation 
about the media is that their message is simplistic enough to be understood with roughly a 
ninth grade level of education. Therefore, it is not hard to argue that citizens, even 
uneducated citizens, will be able to receive and respond to signals on issues they care about. 
Peter Enns articulates this view with his theory of message reception (Enns 2006a).  Perhaps 
all groups respond to the media message, and biases, instead of preventing a shift in opinion, 
merely provide a different baseline for that group. This paper has now exceeded its scope. 
The only thing left to be said is that future research should not give up on the question of 
                                                 
15 It may be incorrect to assume that sophisticates have the requisite time and interest to learn about every issue 
simply because they are sophisticated. 
 
16 This is what Stimson concludes in Tides, dismal as it sounds. 
 
17 Data and time constraints made such an analysis prohibitive for this paper but the results for Executive 
Confidence support this idea. 
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who moves opinion because its implications are too great for representation in American 
democracy. 
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